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Structured patient data like Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are a valuable source for clinical research.
However, the sensitive nature of such information requires some anonymisation procedure to be applied
before releasing the data to third parties. Several studies have shown that the removal of identifying attri-
butes, like the Social Security Number, is not enough to obtain an anonymous data ﬁle, since unique com-
binations of other attributes as for example, rare diagnoses and personalised treatments, may lead to
patient’s identity disclosure. To tackle this problem, Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) methods have
been proposed to mask sensitive attributes while preserving, up to a certain degree, the utility of anon-
ymised data. Most of these methods focus on continuous-scale numerical data. Considering that part of
the clinical data found in EHRs is expressed with non-numerical attributes as for example, diagnoses,
symptoms, procedures, etc., their application to EHRs produces far from optimal results. In this paper,
we propose a general framework to enable the accurate application of SDC methods to non-numerical
clinical data, with a focus on the preservation of semantics. To do so, we exploit structured medical
knowledge bases like SNOMED CT to propose semantically-grounded operators to compare, aggregate
and sort non-numerical terms. Our framework has been applied to several well-known SDC methods
and evaluated using a real clinical dataset with non-numerical attributes. Results show that the exploi-
tation of medical semantics produces anonymised datasets that better preserve the utility of EHRs.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Recent advances in Electronic Health Record (EHR) technology
have signiﬁcantly increased the amount of clinical data electroni-
cally available. These data, consisting of medical and scientiﬁc doc-
uments and also of digitalised patient health records, are valuable
resources for clinical and translational research. The analysis of the
health care experience captured in clinical databases may lead to
improved continuity in patient assessment, improved treatment,
avoidance of adverse drugs reactions, and in ensuring that people
at risk receive appropriate support services [11] [18].
Since medical information is usually associated to individuals,
privacy must be ensured when data is made available for second-
ary use. This is explicitly stated by the Data Protection Act 1998
and the Human Rights Act 1998, which consider clinical data as
‘‘sensitive’’. Nowadays, EHRs are collected and maintained by pub-
lic and private institutions that made them available for clinicians
and researchers. Those institutions should guarantee that healthll rights reserved.
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tient’s authorisation. Exemptions are allowed in Section 39 of the
Data Protection Act for medical purposes as well as statistical or
historical research [11]. Moreover, the US Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rule permits publish-
ing personal health information for public-health purposes
without patient consent, if individual’s privacy is ‘‘sufﬁciently’’
guaranteed [24]. To guarantee this privacy, the HIPAA either re-
quires that experts in statistical and/or scientiﬁc methods certify
that an individual’s identity is protected from exposure under rea-
sonable expectations (Expert Determination) or requires the re-
moval of 18 data elements, named Protected Health Information
(PHI) [1], to consider data de-identiﬁed (Safe Harbour); PHI in-
cludes names, census, geographical and ﬁnancial information and
biometrics, among others.
While data de-identiﬁcation (by removing identifying attributes
as proposed in the HIPAA privacy rules) prevents linking conﬁden-
tial data and patient’s identity, it provides a false appearance of
anonymity. Patient disclosure could still happen through statistical
matching of remaining attributes. Several studies demonstrated
that it is still possible to identify a patient by combining attributes
which, when considered individually, did not seem problematic
[5,11], that is, they were not considered PHI. There have been
cases of disclosure in a priori protected clinical data, such as the
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through the analysis of released tabular data [31]. The identiﬁca-
tion was possible due to the low amount of late abortions in the re-
gion in which both the patient and the clinician were located. In
[18] authors developed a technique for re-identifying seemingly
anonymous genomic data by analysing combinations of, a priori,
non-identifying attributes. Medical data, due to their variability
and high dimensionality, is very prone to the appearance of identi-
fying combinations of attribute values, which may enable disclo-
sure when evaluated together.
The disclosure of patient electronic health records supposes a
serious threat. Moreover, the awareness of the disclosure risks
inherent to data release may lead to future reluctances and lack
of trust in making data available for research. The fact that medical
data does not get published or that it is excessively perturbed (e.g.
encrypted or partially supressed) to minimise disclosure risk to the
extent that it does not meet a level of accuracy, may produce a se-
vere impact in its utility, hampering the beneﬁts that can be ex-
tracted from its analysis [30].
To avoid these problems, privacy preserving methods providing
additional privacy guarantees over the basic data de-identiﬁcation
must be developed. These methods suppose that direct or formal
identiﬁers (such as PHI elements) have been already removed
(e.g. according to the HIPAA privacy rules), and generate some dis-
tortion (i.e., masking) on the combinations of potentially identify-
ing values. These last attributes are considered quasi-identiﬁers,
referring to attribute sets whose values may produce rare or even
unique combinations (e.g., very speciﬁc diagnostics or personalised
treatments), and which may unequivocally identify an individual.
Hence, these attribute can be used by a potential attacker to dis-
close the identity of certain individuals. In addition to data mask-
ing, it is also equally important to assure the quality of the
published data. Therefore, data distortion derived from quasi-iden-
tiﬁers masking should be done in a way the anonymised data re-
tains its utility as much as possible, so that similar conclusions
can be extracted from the analysis of the original and the anony-
mised version of the dataset.
Different techniques for masking quasi-identiﬁers can be envi-
sioned according to the type of data to deal with. Medical data
can be presented as unstructured textual documents or as struc-
tured patient records collecting values for a set of normalised attri-
butes (e.g., symptoms, diagnosis and treatment observed in a visit
to a certain patient). In the former case, document sanitisation
methods have been developed [24]; the latter case refers to privacy
protection in structured databases [5], which is the focus of this
paper.
1.1. Statistical disclosure control in structured databases
o minimise disclosure in structured databases (like EHRs), ano-
nymisation methods framed in the Statistical Disclosure Control
(SDC) area have been proposed. Many of these methods focus on
removing/modifying quasi-identiﬁers, such as diagnosis + treat-
ment, to fulﬁl a privacy model such as k-anonymity property [37],
in which this paper is focused. An anonymised dataset is considered
k-anonymous if any combination of quasi-identiﬁer attribute val-
ues is repeated, at least, k times. The practical result is that each re-
cord (e.g. a patient health record) in a dataset is indistinguishable
from, at least, k  1 other records with respect to their quasi-iden-
tiﬁer attributes. The higher the k-value is, the lower the chance that
an attacker could disclose individual identities, evenwhen applying
statistical inference over attribute value combinations.
Since original data have to be modiﬁed so that it becomes
k-anonymous (and also more homogenous), a loss of information
occurs. High information loss in anonymised datasets is undesir-
able, since it may negatively inﬂuence data utility in certain analyt-ical tasks [5]. Hence, considering that different masking processes
could equally achieve a desired level of k-anonymity, SDC methods
select the one that, according to a heuristic, minimise the informa-
tion loss. In general, information loss and disclosure risk are oppo-
site dimensions that SDC methods try to optimise/balance [5].
Different techniques can be identiﬁed according to the algorith-
mic principles in which SDC methods rely to create anonymised
datasets [5]. The simplest methods supress records whose attri-
butes represent unique or rare value combinations [32,36]. This
strategy has been usually applied in the past to anonymise medical
data [11,28]. Even though, it results in a high information loss since
the utility of supressed records is completely lost. Moreover, in
heterogeneous datasets (such as health records), many records
could be removed.
Instead of removing, more sophisticated methods modify attri-
bute values to make records indistinguishable (i.e. k-anonymous)
from other ones. The most well-known is microaggregation
[2,6,8,19]. It builds groups/clusters of, at least, k original records
according to a similarity function; then, each record of each cluster
is replaced by the centre of the cluster, obtaining a k-anonymous
dataset with the same number of records as the original one. Since
similar records are aggregated together, the information loss
resulting from the replacements can be minimised. Other methods
are based on data resampling [7,13], which sample and sort the re-
cords (according to a comparison criterion), and replace each one
by the average of the values of all taken samples. By taking and
replacing, at least, k records/samples at each iteration, k-anonym-
ity can be fulﬁlled [20]. Finally, recoding methods [21] iteratively
replace the most similar record pairs/sets so that they become
indistinguishable. The process is repeated until the whole dataset
becomes k-anonymous.
Most algorithms focus on numerical attributes [5]. When ap-
plied to numerical data, the goal of anonymisation methods is to
minimise the disclosure risk while retaining the distributional
and statistical features of original data. In recent years, however,
large amounts of non-numerical data, such as categorical attri-
butes or textual responses, are commonly collected and published
[39]. In the medical domain many potentially identifying data is
expressed by means of non-numerical attributes, such as textual
visit outcomes, diagnoses or treatments [24]. The accurate man-
agement (comparison/transformation) of this kind of data is not
straightforward because, on the contrary to numbers, they take
values from a discrete and ﬁnite list of modalities, which are usu-
ally expressed by words. Since arithmetic operators cannot be ap-
plied to this kind of data, simplistic approaches use equality/
inequality operators and distributional statistics (e.g., mode) to
compare and aggregate them [6,9,38]. These approaches neglect
the most important dimension of non-numerical data, which is
the way in which humans interpret them: semantics. Since the
preservation of semantics is crucial to ensure the utility of anony-
mised results [22,39], these methods are likely to severely hamper
the utility of anonymised data.
Recently, some authors have started considering data semantics
during anonymisation [12,19,21,39]. Since semantics is an inher-
ently human feature, the interpretation of textual values requires
some sort of human-deﬁned knowledge source, which provides a
formal and machine-readable way to express a shared conceptuali-
sation by means of a uniﬁed terminology and semantic inter-
relations (e.g., taxonomical generalisations). Ad-hoc structures or
more general domain taxonomies, folksonomies, or ontologies
[2,4,12,22,25] have been used to accurately anonymise textual data
and maximise its utility by retaining data semantics.
Due to the importance of terminology and knowledge in clinical
assessment, the medical domain has been very prone to the devel-
opment of large and detailed knowledge structures. ICD-9/10,
MeSH or SNOMED CT [26,35] are paradigmatic examples of
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nomically structured medical terms. However, as far as we know,
there are no precedents using these structures to semantically
anonymise non-numerical medical data.
1.2. Contribution and plan
In this paper, we propose a general framework that enables the
anonymisation of structured non-numerical medical data (i.e.,
medical terms, such as names of symptoms or diagnosis) from a
semantic perspective. The framework proposes and formalises
three operators (comparison, aggregation and sorting) that, by
exploiting medical knowledge structures (like the above-
mentioned ones), enable a semantically-coherent managing of
medical terms.
Afterwards, the framework is used to adapt three well-
differenced SDC methods, so that structured non-numerical data
could be k-anonymised while retaining their semantics as much
as possible. These methods are evaluated and compared using a
real medical dataset consisting of structured clinical outcomes
and SNOMED CT as the medical knowledge base, under the dimen-
sions of semantic information loss and computational cost. Results
show that a semantically-grounded approach will more likely re-
tain the utility of anonymised data when compared with classical
non-semantic methods.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
our framework, formalising three semantically-grounded opera-
tors. Section 3 shows how this framework can be applied to several
well-known SDC methods. Section 4 evaluates our proposal using
those methods. The ﬁnal section contains the conclusions.Fig. 1. The subsumer hierarchy for the set V1, extracted from SNOMED CT.2. A semantic framework for non-numerical data
As discussed in Section 1.2, classical SDC methods omit the
semantic component of non-numerical data, focusing solely on
their distributional properties. In this section, we present a general
framework that integrates both features of non-numerical data.
The framework captures the semantics of data by relying on the
measurement of the semantic similarity between terms [33], as-
sessed from medical knowledge bases, while taking into account
the frequency of data, as well. In the following, we formalise the
problem to solve; then, three semantically-grounded operators to
manage non-numerical data are presented: comparison, aggrega-
tion and sorting.
2.1. Problem formalisation
A structured database consists of n records corresponding to
individuals, each one containing m attribute values. To explicitly
consider term frequencies, we represent the dataset in the form
of V = {hv1,x1i, . . . , hvp,xpi}, where each hvi,xii tuple states the
number xi of repetitions of each distinct value vi found in V. Note
that, typically, p (i.e., the number of distinct values) would be sig-
niﬁcantly lower than n (i.e., the total amount of records).
Example 1. Given the univariate dataset V stating patient diagno-
sis, {asbestosis, degenerative disorder, amyotrophia, myoﬁbrosis,
asbestosis, allergy, myoﬁbrosis, allergy, squint, amyotrophia, degen-
erative disorder, allergy}, we represent it as V = {hasbestosis,2i,
hdegenerative disorder,2i, hamyotrophia,2i, hmyoﬁbrosis,2i,
hallergy,3i, hsquint,1i}. Note that, in this example, m = 1, n = 12
and p = 6.
This formalisation can be generalised for multivariate datasets
with m > 1 attributes as follows. Let MV = {h{v11, . . . ,v1m},
x1i, . . . , h{vp1,. . .vpm}, xpi} be the representation of the dataset,where each tuple {vi1, . . . ,vim} represents a distinct combination of
m attribute values, and xi states its number of occurrences (i.e.,
the frequency).
Considering that the goal of many SDC methods (like those
introduced in Section 1.2) is to fulﬁl the k-anonymity property, if
xi is equal or greater than a given value of k, the corresponding re-
cords in this tuple are already k-anonymous since they fulﬁl de-
sired level of privacy. Hence, the goal of the anonymisation
process consists of generating a dataset where xiP k, "i.
2.2. Comparison operator
During the grouping step of the anonymisation process, similar
records should be put together so that the information loss of the
posterior value replacement could be minimised. To do so, a com-
parison operator is needed. Groups are built around a base value b,
whose selection depends on the anonymisation method (more de-
tails in Section 3), to which the most similar records of the dataset
are joined. Hence, the comparison operator should be able to rank
the set of records in the dataset according to their distancewith the
base value b.
To consider the value semantics during this comparison, we rely
on the notion of semantic similarity, which quantiﬁes the taxonom-
ical resemblance of compared terms based on semantic evidences
extracted from a knowledge base [3,29,33]. To evaluate clinical
terms, we use a medical structured terminology like SNOMED CT
as the knowledge base, which offers a taxonomic structure in
which subsumption relations are modelled as links between clini-
cal terms. In [3,34], a state-of-the-art measure based term sub-
sumption is proposed, which quantiﬁes the semantic distance
between term pairs sd(v1,v2) as a function of the number of non-
common subsumers of (v1,v2) (numerator in the fraction of Eq.
(1)). This value is normalised by the complete set of subsumers
of (v1,v2) (denominator in the fraction of Eq. (1)).
sdðv1;v2Þ ¼ log2 1þ
jTðv1Þ [ Tðv2Þj  jTðv1Þ \ Tðv2Þj
jTðv1Þ [ Tðv2Þj
 
; ð1Þ
where T(vi) is the set of taxonomic subsumers of vi, including itself.
An advantage of this measure is that it evaluates all the taxo-
nomical ancestors of the evaluated terms, considering also multi-
ple taxonomical inheritance, which are very common in medical
taxonomies [3]. As a result, it showed improved accuracy over re-
lated works in several medical [3] and general purpose [34]
benchmarks.
Example 2. As an illustrative example of the semantic distance
measure, let us consider a univariate dataset where the attribute
refers to diseases: V1 = {asbestosis, amyotrophia, myoﬁbrosis, allergy,
degenerative disorder, squint}. Fig. 1 shows an extract of the
taxonomy modelling these diseases in SNOMED CT. Applying Eq.
(1) to all the possible pairs of terms we obtain the semantic
distance values shown in Table 1. We can see, for example, that
Table 1
Semantic distance between term pairs of Example 2, according to the SNOMED CT taxonomy extract shown in Fig. 1.
Semantic distance Asbestosis Amyotrophia Myoﬁbrosis Allergy Squint Degenerative disorder
Asbestosis 0 0.68 0.68 0.85 0.85 0.42
Amyotrophia 0.68 0 0.49 0.87 0.87 0.58
Myoﬁbrosis 0.68 0.49 0 0.87 0.87 0.58
Allergy 0.85 0.87 0.87 0 0.58 0.81
Squint 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.58 0 0.81
Degenerative disorder 0.42 0.58 0.58 0.81 0.81 0
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than allergy and squint, because the former are more speciﬁc and,
hence, they share more subsumers.
Applying this measure, we can semantically compare, rank and
group the most similar (i.e., least distant) record values vi in a data-
set with respect to a base value b from which each group is built,
using sd(b,vi).
To consider also the data distribution, since each distinct value
vi appearsxi times in the dataset (as formalised in Section 2.1), we
propose to count the semantic distance between a given value vi
and the base value b as many times as indicated by its frequency
of appearance xi. In that way, the accumulated distances resulting
from grouping together b and all the records with the value vi can
be minimised.
Formally, the comparison operator used to group records with
respect to a base value is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. The weighted semantic distance (wsd) between a
univariate reference value b and a univariate set of records hvi,xii
is deﬁned as:
wsdðb; hv i;xiiÞ ¼ x  sdðb; v iÞ ð2Þ
This measure can be generalised to multivariate data as follows:Deﬁnition 2. The distance between a multivariate reference value
with m attributes {b1, . . . ,bm} and a multivariate set of records
h{vi1, . . . ,vim},xii is deﬁned as the average of the weighted semantic
distances of the individual attribute values:
wsdðfb1; . . . ; bmg; hfv i1; . . . ;v img;xiiÞ ¼
Pm
j¼1wsdðbj; hv ij;xiiÞ
m
ð3Þ2.3. Aggregation operator
Aggregation refers to the process of replacing several records by
a single one that summarised them, so that values becoming indis-
tinguishable. The aggregated value is understood as the prototype
or centroid of a set of values. Since the replacement of record sets
by their centroids causes a loss of information, the selection of
an accurate centroid is crucial to retain the utility of anonymised
data.
Centroid calculus for numerical data relies on standard averag-
ing operators (e.g. arithmeticmean) [5]. However, the accurate cen-
troid calculus for non-numerical data is challenging due to the lack
of semantic aggregation operators and the necessity of considering
a discrete set of centroid values. Related works propose methods to
compute centroids for non-numerical data either relying on the dis-
tributional features of data, where the centroid is the modal value
[38], or on background semantic, where the centroid is the term
that generalises all aggregated values in a taxonomy [2]. Since only
one dimension of data (distribution or semantics) is considered,
both approaches result in suboptimal results [23].
In this section, we propose a centroid calculation method for
multivariate non-numerical data that considers, in an integrated
manner, both semantics and distribution of data. To obtain accu-rate centroids, the background knowledge base is exploited not
only to semantically compare terms, as proposed in the previous
section, but also to retrieve the centroid candidates.
Formally, given a distance function d, the centroid of a set of
values {v1, v2, . . . ,vp} is deﬁned as:
centroidðv1;v2; . . . ;vpÞ ¼ argmin
c
Xp
i¼1
dðc; v iÞ
( )
ð4Þ
where c is a centroid candidate for the set of elements.
The ﬁrst issue concerns the search space of centroid candidates
(c). Since c must be necessarily a discrete value, some approaches
(like the ones based on taking the modal value of a sample [38])
bound the set of possible candidates to those values appearing in
the input dataset. Hence, the centroid accuracy would depend on
the granularity and suitability of the input data. In our case, since
we rely on medical knowledge bases like SNOMED CT, which offer
detailed and ﬁne grained taxonomical structures, we extend the
centroid search space to all terms of the taxonomy related to the
input data. For semantic coherence, centroid candidates will be
all input terms together with their taxonomical ancestors.
To apply Eq. (4) to the centroid calculation, it is necessary to use
an appropriate distance function. We propose the use of the
weighted semantic distance deﬁned in the previous section.
Formally, let us take V = {hv1,x1i, . . . , hvp,xpi} as an input data-
set with a single non-numerical attribute. The ﬁrst step maps the
terms vi of the set V in a background knowledge base (like SNOMED
CT) and extracts the minimum hierarchy H that taxonomically
models all vi values. All terms in H, which include both values in
V and their taxonomical ancestors, are considered as centroid can-
didates. Next, applying Eq. (4), the term c in H that minimises the
weighted semantic distance (Eq. (2)) to all vi in Vwill be selected as
the centroid. Note that, in this case, each centroid candidate c acts
as the base value in Eq. (2).
Deﬁnition 3. The centroid of a set of non-numerical values vi in V
is deﬁned as the term cj that minimises the weighted semantic
distance wsd with respect to all the values vi in the space V.
centroidðVÞ ¼ argmin
8cj2H
Xp
i¼1
wsdðcj; hv i;xiiÞ
 !( )
ð5ÞExample 3. As an illustrative example, let us consider the univar-
iate dataset: V = {hasbestosis,2i, hdegenerative disorder,2i, hamyotro-
phia,2i, hmyoﬁbrosis,2i, hallergy,3i, hsquint,1i}. By mapping these
clinical terms in SNOMED CT, we are able to extract the minimum
hierarchy H, shown in Fig. 2. Hence, the centroid candidates are
those values in H. For each one, we compute the accumulated
sum of weighted semantic distances over vi, as stated in Eq. (5)
(see numbers in brackets in Fig. 2). In this case, the value that mini-
mises the distance against all vi is ‘‘degenerative disorder’’, since its
accumulated sum of wsd is 6.81. This value reﬂects the information
loss resulting from replacing values in V by their aggregation,
which should be ideally minimised. So, applying Deﬁnition 3, cen-
troid(V) = degenerative disorder.
Fig. 2. The minimum hierarchy H for values in V, extracted from SNOMED CT.
Numbers in parenthesis represent the amount of repetitions of each value in the
dataset. Numbers in brackets represent the accumulated distance of each centroid
candidate according to Eq. (5).
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all values in V (i.e. disease) nor the modal value (i.e. allergy and
asbestosis with three appearances) minimise the accumulated dis-
tance. On the one hand, using as centroid the term that generalises
all values for non-uniformly distributed data [2], usually results in
a high loss of information due to the necessity to generalise outli-
ers (e.g. squint). On the other hand, even though any of the modal
values resulted in more accurate (but not optimal) centroids, the
ﬁnal selection will produce signiﬁcantly different information loss
(i.e. allergywith 8.24 and asbestosiswith 6.93). The fact that several
modal values exist is quite common in large datasets with a limited
amount of modalities, a problem that affects approaches based so-
lely on distributional features of data [38].
For simplicity, considering attributes as independent variables,
the above method can be generalised for multivariate data by com-
puting individual centroids for each attribute as follows:
Deﬁnition 4. The centroid of a set of multivariate data MV with m
attributes is deﬁned as:
centroidðMVÞ ¼ fcentroidðA1Þ; centroidðA2Þ; . . . ; centroidðAmÞg ð6Þ
where Aj the set the set of distinct values for the jth attribute inMV.2.4. Sorting operator
Some SDC methods (like resampling [20]) require from sorting
input data before grouping them. Again, sorting non-numerical
values is not straightforward since, in general, they are not ordinal.
To sort a set of values, a reference point is needed, so that values
could be arranged according to their similarity/distance to that ref-
erence. Numerically, this is done according to the max/min value
(i.e. the most extreme value) of the set. To deﬁne a sorting proce-
dure for the non-numerical case, we also rely on the notion of the
most extreme value, which corresponds to the one that, globally, is
the most distant to all other values (conceptually, this is the oppo-
site of the centroid as computed in section 2.3). Once this reference
value is obtained, other values are sorted by iteratively picking
those that are least distant to that extreme value.
To obtain the reference value/record as well as to compare it to
other elements in the set, we rely on the weighted semantic dis-
tance and the centroid calculus procedure proposed in Sections
2.2 and 2.3. The sorting procedure is formalised as follows:
Algorithm 1 (Sorting procedure).
1. Pick, as reference point, the most distant record (according to
Eq. (2)) to the centroid of the dataset (obtained with Eq. (5)).
2. Sort the rest of records by taking, at each iteration, the least dis-
tant one (Eq. (2)) to the reference point.Notice that Eqs. (3) and (6) should be used, instead, in case of
multivariate datasets.
3. Applying the semantic framework to SDC methods
By means of the framework presented in the previous section
and exploiting a medical knowledge base like SNOMED CT, non-
numerical medical terms can be coherently compared and aggre-
gated. Since many SDC methods rely on these operators to anony-
mise data, our framework enables an accurate anonymisation of
medical datasets according to their semantic and distributional
features.
In this section, we use our framework to adapt three well-
known SDC methods (recoding, microaggregation and resampling,
introduced in Section 1.2) originally designed to deal with numer-
ical data, to the non-numerical case.3.1. Recoding
Data recoding provides a simple way to build k-anonymous
datasets. This methodology consists in replacing non-k-anony-
mous records (i.e., those whose xi < k) by another already existing
record with different attribute values [21]. To select the replace-
ment that minimises the information loss, the least distant and least
frequent distinct record pair is selected.
The behaviour for the recoding method presented in [21] is gi-
ven in Algorithm 2, highlighting in bold the steps in which the
operators proposed in our framework are used.
Algorithm 2 (Recoding).
1. Select the group of records with the minimum number of repe-
titions. As long as this number is lower than k, the dataset is not
k-anonymous.
2. Find the least distant record to the records in the group, with
the lowest amount of repetitions.
3. Original values are replaced by the least distant one, increasing
their anonymity level due to the higher amount of value
repetitions.
4. Repeat the process for the next least frequent record set (step 1)
until the k-anonymity is fulﬁlled.
The adaptation of this method to non-numerical data is
straightforward using the comparison operator proposed in the
semantic framework in Section 2.2.
3.2. Microaggregation
Microaggregation is one of the most commonly used privacy-
preserving methods, since it tends to better preserve data utility
[2,6,16,19].
As microaggregation algorithm, we selected the well-known
Maximum Distance Average Vector (MDAV) method [19]. It is based
on generating clusters of at least k elements around the most dis-
tant records to the dataset centroid. To minimise information loss,
clusters are built by picking up the least distant records around ref-
erence records. The method’s behaviour is detailed in Algorithm 3,
highlighting in bold the steps in which the operators proposed in
our framework are used.
Algorithm 3 (Microaggregation).
1. Calculate the centroid of the complete dataset. Then, the most
distant record r to the centroid and themost distant record s to
r are selected.
Table 2
Example of clinical data used for evaluation. Numbers in parenthesis represent the
ICD-9 codes.
ID Age
range
Patient
ZIP code
Principal diagnosis
cause of admission
Other condition that coexist
at the time of admission
 50-
54
916 Abstinent alcoholic
(291.81)
Metabolic acidosis due to
salicylate (276.2)
 65-
69
913 Infected spinal
ﬁxation device
(996.67)
Uric acid renal calculus
(592.0)
 65-
69
903 Aneurysm of
thoracic aorta
(441.2)
Cardiac oedema (428.0)
 P85 902 Fibroma of ovary
(218.9)
Chronic osteoarthritis
(715.9)
 30–
34
917 Acute fulminating
appendicitis (540.9)
Body mass index 40+ –
severely obese (V85.4)
1 http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/PatDischargeData/PublicDataSet
index.html.
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tant records to r, obtaining a cluster centroid. The same proce-
dure is repeated for the record s.
3. The whole process is repeated until no records remain
ungrouped. Note than since it is possible that less than k records
remain after clustering the dataset (i.e. they cannot form a
k-anonymous cluster), these are added to the cluster with the
least distant centroid, recalculating the centroid of the modi-
ﬁed clusters.
4. Finally, original records are replaced by the centroid of the clus-
ter to which they belong. Since all records are grouped and
aggregated with at least k  1 other records, the resulting data-
set is k-anonymous.
By means of our framework, whenever a centroid needs to be
obtained (either of the whole dataset, step 1, or of a particular
cluster, steps 2 and 3), the procedure proposed in Section 2.3 can be
applied. Since clusters are built according to the selected centroid
and records are replaced by cluster centroids, the fact that centroids
minimise the accumulated semantic distances of the aggregated
terms helps to minimise the information loss. Again, the compar-
ison operator presented in Section 2.2, can be used to obtain the
most/least semantically distant record, when needed. Since our
operator considers all record value repetitions at once, identical
records can be clustered together, obtaining more cohesive groups.
3.3. Resampling
Data resampling, as deﬁned in [20], is an anonymisation method
consisting in making k random samples of input data; then sam-
ples are sorted and records of each sample are grouped and aggre-
gated so that they fulﬁl the k-anonymity property. Compared to
the above methods, resampling is faster since the sampling process
is done randomly, which makes it especially suitable for very large
datasets. By contrast, the random criteria may negatively inﬂuence
the information loss.
The method’s behaviour is detailed in Algorithm 4, highlighting
in bold the steps in which the operators proposed in the semantic
framework are used.
Algorithm 4 (Resampling).
1. Create random k samples of n/k records, without replacement
(i.e., each record is taken only once).
2. Sort these samples and create sets Pi with the records at the ith
position of all samples, so that similar records are put together
at similar positions of different samples.
3. Calculate the centroid of each Pi. Add the (n mod k) remaining
records to the set Pi with the least distant centroid. The anon-
ymised dataset is obtained by replacing all records of each Pi by
the centroid of Pi. Since, by deﬁnition, Pi contains at least k
records, this process generates a k-anonymous dataset.
In this case, the sorting procedure proposed in Section 2.4 can
be applied to step 2 so that records are arranged according to their
semantic similarity. The reference value to perform the sorting
process is the centroid of each sample. Again, the proposed
centroid procedure can be applied to compute semantically
coherent centroids of each set (step 3), and the comparison
operator can be used to select the least semantically distant
centroid for the remaining records (step 3).
4. Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the contribution of our framework
to the SDC methods discussed in Section 3 during the anonymisa-tion of clinical data with non-numerical attributes. Results are
compared according to information loss against the classic non-
semantic anonymisation and a naïve method based on data
suppression.4.1. The dataset
As evaluation data, we used a structured database containing
inpatient information provided by the California Ofﬁce of State-
wide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) collected from li-
censed hospitals in California.1 Speciﬁcally, we used the latest
patient discharge dataset (4th quarter of 2009) of the hospital with
the largest amount of records (i.e., Cedars Sinai Medical Center, Los
Angeles County).
Prior to publication, the OSHPD has masked or removed some
attribute values related to demographic variables that may enable
re-identiﬁcation (see an example on the ﬁrst three columns of Ta-
ble 2), as suggested by the HIPAA rules for data anonymisation [1].
For example, speciﬁc patient age has been masked in a range of 20
categories. Other attributes, such as the hospital identiﬁcation
number have been directly removed from the dataset, whereas
the later digits of the ZIP code were also removed. However, clini-
cal data related for example to diagnoses are published ‘‘as is’’,
since these are not considered PHI; see the last two columns of Ta-
ble 2. From these, we focused on two non-numerical attributes cor-
responding to the principal diagnosis and other conditions of the
patient at the time of the admission (i.e., m = 2), which are stored
as ICD-9 codes in the original data ﬁle. After removing records with
missing information, a total of 3006 individual records is available
for testing (i.e., n = 3006). Data distribution for these two attributes
is shown in Fig. 3. A total of 2331 different combinations of values
(i.e., p = 2331 tuples) can be found, from which a signiﬁcant
amount (2073) are unique. As demonstrated in previous works
(such as the late abortion identiﬁcation case [31]), when rare or
even unique combinations of this type of clinical attributes appear,
patient private information disclosure may happen if a third party
knows other patient’s data as for example, the hospital name, its
address or the period of hospitalisation. Hence, we considered
them as quasi-identiﬁers that should be masked in addition to the
already removed identiﬁers suggested by the HIPAA privacy rules.
At the same time, considering that patient diagnoses are valuable
information for clinical research, its anonymisation should pre-
serve the utility of data by minimising the information loss of
the anonymisation process. Finally, since values for these attri-
butes are non-numerical, a structured medical knowledge base/
Fig. 3. Distribution of distinct value tuples for the principal and other conditions attributes.
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by our framework. Since ICD-9 codes were available for each
condition, we translated them into SNOMED-CT concepts, using a
publicly available mapping ﬁle.2 After this mapping, the SNOMED-
CT ontology can be used in the anonymisation and evaluation pro-
cesses. Thanks to its size and taxonomic detail (with more than
311,000 unique concepts organised in 18 overlapping hierarchies
with more than 1.36 million relationships), SNOMED-CT is especially
suitable to assist semantic similarity assessments [3,29,33].
4.2. Evaluating the preservation of data semantics
Taking into consideration that the preservation of data seman-
tics is crucial to retain the utility of anonymised non-numerical
data [22,39], in our tests, we measured the quality of anonymised
data by quantifying the semantic information loss caused by replac-
ing quasi-identiﬁer attribute values by their masked versions. Note
that, since our point of departure is an already de-identiﬁed data-
set according to the HIPAA privacy rules, our results measure the
additional information loss resulting solely from masking quasi-
identiﬁers.
In the literature, information loss of SDC methods focusing on
the k-anonymity property is usually measured as the Sum of
Squared Errors (SSE) [2,5,8,16,27]. It is deﬁned as the sum of
squares of the distances between the original records and their
masked version (Eq. (7)). Hence, the lower the SSE is, the lower
the information loss, and the higher the data utility will potentially
be. To measure the information loss from a semantic perspective,
we computed SSE scores using the semantic distance sd deﬁned
in Eq.1 and SNOMED CT as the knowledge base. Since we are deal-
ing with multivalued data, the average of distances for all attribute
values is considered, as follows:
SSE ¼
Xn
i¼1
Pm
j¼1sd xij; x
A
ij
 
m
0
@
1
A
2
ð7Þ
where n is the number of records in the dataset, each one composed
by m attributes, xij is the original value of the jth attribute of the ith
record and xAij denotes its masked version.
In the following, we evaluate the beneﬁts of our semantic
framework regarding the preservation of data semantics in com-
parison with a non-semantic approach. The three SDC methods
introduced in Section 3 will be tested under two different conﬁg-
urations: (1) using classical non-semantic operators and (2)
using the semantic operators proposed in our framework. In
the ﬁrst case, values are compared using the equality test (i.e.,2 http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/licensedcontent/snomedctarchive.html.0 distance if they are identical and 1 otherwise), whereas the
centroid is the most frequent record (i.e., mode). This setting
depicts the behaviour of classical anonymising approaches
dealing with non-numerical attributes from a non-semantic
perspective [9,38]. In the second setting, the three operators pro-
posed in Section 2 are used, conﬁguring a semantically-grounded
anonymisation.
Since the three SDC methods aim at fulﬁlling the k-anonymity
property, an analysis with respect to the k anonymity level has
been done. Considering the data distribution shown in Fig. 3, the
k-level has been set from 2 to 15, so that for k = 15, up to a 90%
of the total amount of records will be masked.
In order to have a reference point for the analysis of the results
of the methods, we have also implemented a naïve algorithm based
on supressing those records not fulﬁlling the k-anonymity property,
that is, records whose value tuples are repeated less than k times.
As stated in Section 2, even though this approach produces a high
information loss, it has been applied in the past to anonymise
structured datasets [32,36] and, more speciﬁcally, medical data
[11,28].
Results of the three SDC algorithms (for semantic and non-
semantic settings) and the suppression method are shown in
Fig. 4, which denotes the differences in –semantic- SSE scores
(Eq. (7)) obtained for the dataset described in Section 4.1 for k-val-
ues between 2 and 15.
As expected, SSE scores grow as k-values increase because, in
order to guarantee higher levels of privacy, more records must be-
come indistinguishable and, hence, more changes on the original
data are required.
Regarding the non-semantic setting, results show that manag-
ing and transforming non-numerical data without considering
their semantic features worse preserves the meaning of original
data. On the contrary, our semantic approach, that considers both
semantics and data distribution, produces signiﬁcantly lower
information loss ﬁgures. This shows the beneﬁts of exploiting
available medical knowledge bases like SNOMED CT, so that data
semantics can be considered (and better preserved) during the
anonymisation process.
For some methods the improvement brought by our framework
is more signiﬁcant than for others. The case of microaggregation is
the most noticeable, since the semantic framework allows retain-
ing more than a 50% more semantic information than a non-
semantic approach. This is coherent, since the microaggregation
method heavily relies on semantic operators to group records
and to aggregate them. On the other side, the resampling method
shows the lowest improvement since it ﬁrst performs a random
sampling of input data, which cannot be optimised from a seman-
tic perspective.
Fig. 4. Semantic Information Loss (SSE) for the three SDC methods (under semantic
and non-semantic settings) and the approach based on data suppression for
different k-anonymity levels.
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cords is signiﬁcantly higher than what was obtained in the seman-
tic approach. Analysing, for example, SSE values of k = 15 (which
corresponds to the maximum level of privacy), we can see that
for the microaggregation algorithm, the SSE when using the
semantic framework is 645, whereas the SSE obtained with sup-
pression is 2875. As discussed in Section 4.1, since most of the re-
cords have quite low frequency of appearance in the original EHR,
even for low k-values, a high percentage of input data is removed.
This severely affects data utility, hampering posterior analyses.This shows the importance of applying utility-preserving SDC
methods to anonymise the data and, more concretely, taking into
consideration both their distributional and semantic features, as
the proposed framework pursues.4.3. Comparing anonymisation methods
This second analysis aims at studying the convenience of using
each SDC method for EHR anonymisation when implemented with
our semantic framework. The three SDC algorithms have been
compared under the perspectives of information loss and runtime.
In addition to the semantic information loss measure intro-
duced above, we also computed a standard utility function focus-
ing solely on the preservation of the original data distribution. In
this last case, the well-known KL-divergence [14] score has been
considered. Being f(xi) and f(xi) the probability distributions of
an original record xi in the original and masked datasets, respec-
tively, the KL-divergence between both datasets is deﬁned as:
KL ¼
Xn
i¼1
f ðxiÞ  ln f ðxiÞf ðxiÞ ð8Þ
A smaller KL score indicates a higher similarity between distri-
butions of records between original and masked datasets.
SSE and KL scores for the different methods using the proposed
framework are shown in Fig. 5 for the same k values as above.
In terms of semantic preservation (SSE), the best method ismic-
roaggregation (which is coherent to results obtained by related
works [6,15]) closely followed by recoding. This makes sense since
both methods heavily rely on semantic operators to aggregate or
replace record values. Resampling, as discussed above, ﬁrstly exe-
cutes a random data sampling that cannot be optimised from a
semantic perspective, hampering data utility. Differences are also
reﬂected on the shape of the SSE function as k-values growth. Both
microaggregation and recoding grow almost linearly with respect to
k. Resampling, otherwise, shows an almost logarithmic shape,
which is coherent to the fact that the sampling is done on sets of
size n/k.
Focusing solely on the preservation of data distribution, KL
scores show a different picture. In this case, recoding provides the
best results, followed by microaggregation and resampling. The fact
that both microaggregation and resampling aggregate records with
their centroids, which are synthetically constructed according to
the background ontology, may cause that new record values/tuples
(i.e. value generalisations and new value tuple combinations) not
found in the original dataset appear in the masked version. Even
though these new records are semantically similar to original ones,
the KL score is penalised, since original values are not found in the
masked version. This fact signiﬁcantly alters the probability distri-
bution of masked data with regards to the original one. On the con-
trary, recoding method systematically replaces records for already
existing values. Hence, the probability of ﬁnding an original record
in the masked dataset will increase, resulting in more similar data
distributions. Resampling, again, provides the worst results (espe-
cially for high k values) due to the randomness of the sampling
process. This produces less cohesive groups and, hence, more gen-
eral centroids that will more likely correspond to generalisations
rather than to values found in the input dataset.
In addition to the degree of information (both semantic and/or
distributional) preservation, considering that EHRs are likely to
contain large amounts of data, the computational efﬁciency of data
anonymisation is a relevant feature to consider when resources are
limited. Fig. 6 shows the comparison for the three SDC methods
executed on a 2.4 GHz Intel Core processor with 4 GB RAM.
Runtime ﬁgures show that the fastest method is resampling,
with an almost negligible runtime. Microaggregation is the slowest
Fig. 5. SSE (semantic) and KL-divergence (distributional) scores for the three SDC methods applying the proposed framework across different levels of k-anonymity.
Fig. 6. Runtime (in seconds) for the three SDC methods applying the proposed
framework across different levels of k-anonymity.
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ues, with an almost inverse logarithmic shape. Results are coherent
to the computational costs of the different methods. First, microag-
gregation scales O(p2/k), where p is the number of distinct records.
Since the number of needed clusters lowers as k increases (since
each cluster groups, at least, k records), the number of microaggre-
gation iterations and, hence the runtime, lowers as k increases.
Recoding replaces non-k-anonymous records by other similar ones,
which implies a cost of O(p2) for each iteration, resulting in a total
of O(p3) in the worst case (i.e. all records are non-k-anonymous).
Since the asymptotic computational cost can neglect the value of
k, the runtime is almost constant with respect to this parameter.
Finally, as resampling ﬁrstly randomly divides input data in n/k
samples, it scales linearly as O(n/k), resulting in the lowest run-
time, which is even lower when k values increase.
Considering the above results, the semantically-grounded mic-
roaggregation method seems the best approach to anonymise clin-
ical data when the meaning of original data should be preserved as
much as possible. Moreover, it is especially efﬁcient for high k-
anonymity values. Recoding would be only considered if very low
k-anonymisation levels are required (being more computationally
efﬁcient than microaggregation) or when analyses to be performed
over masked data will be focused solely on data distribution rather
than on their semantics. Finally, only when input EHRs are so large
to be non-computationally feasibly anonymised by means of mic-
roaggregation or recoding methods, the resampling method couldbe considered thanks to its high efﬁciency, at the expenses of a
higher information loss (both semantic and distributional).5. Conclusions
Appropriate measures to protect the privacy of EHRs should be
taken before making them available for clinical research. Previous
works have shown that a basic de-identiﬁcation of medical data as
proposed by the HIPAA Privacy Rule is, sometimes, not enough. On
the one hand, original data should be anonymised in a way that the
chance of patient disclosure, even when applying statistical meth-
ods, is sufﬁciently reduced. On the other hand, anonymised data-
sets should retain as much information as possible, so that they
are still useful for research tasks. SDC methods aim at balancing
these two complementary dimensions, offering additional privacy
guarantees with respect to the removal of direct identiﬁers, which
represents their point of departure. However, most of these meth-
ods have been designed to deal with numerical values.
Considering the amount and importance of non-numerical data
in EHRs, in this paper we presented a general framework that pro-
vides semantically-grounded comparison, aggregation and sorting
operators. Exploiting a structured medical knowledge base like
SNOMED-CT, and relying on the theory of semantic similarity, these
operators enable a semantically-coherent interpretation of non-
numerical attributes, while also considering their distributional
features. Since many SDC methods (particularly those focused on
fulﬁlling k-anonymity) rely on these basic operators to anonymise
data, as described in Section 1.2, they can directly apply the pro-
posed semantic framework to produce semantically-grounded
anonymisations for non-numerical data. As shown in the evalua-
tion performed with a real clinical dataset, the use of this frame-
work considerably improves the degree of semantic preservation
for all the considered methods, in comparison with non-semantic
approaches based solely on information distribution. As a result,
the meaning of data and, hence, the utility of the anonymised data
from a semantic perspective is better preserved.
As future work, we plan to research on the application of our
semantic framework to other privacy models and methods. Partic-
ularly it is important to note that privacy models such as k-ano-
nymity, even though providing a more robust anonymisation in
front of statistical disclosure attacks than the sole removal of iden-
tifying attributes, present some limitations. A series of attacks
based on the background knowledge that a potential attacker
may have about certain individuals have been identiﬁed [17]. In
these cases, more robust privacy models such as differential privacy
can be embraced. Differential privacy [10] ensures that released
S. Martínez et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 46 (2013) 294–303 303data are insensitive to any individual’s data (i.e. the alteration of
one input records). Hence, individual data remains uncertain for
an attacker. To achieve this, an amount of noise is usually added
to the output to introduce uncertainty, a process that implies a loss
of information. The approach proposed in this paper could be ex-
tended to fulﬁl differential privacy by adding appropriate noise
to, for example, the record counts of each aggregated group [25].
In this case, an equilibrium between the degree of data aggregation
and the amount of noise should be carefully considered to mini-
mise information loss.
Another line of research consists on supporting the anonymisa-
tion of less structured textual inputs such as free text. In this case, a
lexico-syntactic pre-processing stage will be necessary to (1) iden-
tify nouns or noun phrases (with semantic content) within the text,
and (2) to map them to their corresponding ontological concepts,
so that their semantics can be interpreted. Linguistic tools includ-
ing sentence/token detection, part-of-speech tagging and stem-
ming can be considered.Acknowledgments
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